Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
The pending Obama Administration policy on missile defense is the quintessential driver for missile defense in Europe. The current world events serve to confirm the growing threat to the security of the homeland and American allies. The
Ballistic Missile Defense System -European Component serves to provide the United
States homeland defense against a ballistic missile launched from Iran or another rogue state. Despite a myriad of strategic factors and considerations that constitute obstacles to employing the U.S. system in Europe, the deciding factor is ultimately the political decision by the President of the United States. Protecting the U.S. homeland and America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies against a ballistic missile attack is a fundamental vital interest of the United States, and deployment of missile defense elements to Europe therefore serves to further U.S. strategic interests. The President must agree to move forward with missile defense writ large, and more specifically with missile defense in Europe while working to minimize the domestic and transatlantic political distracters to its implementation.
MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE -WHO DECIDES?
This paper addresses the primary obstacles to employing the missile defense (MD) capability required to adequately defend the eastern coast of the United States against ballistic missiles launched from Iran or another rogue state. Although the Obama Administration faces several strategic challenges regarding the decision to move forward with MD in Europe, the deciding factor is ultimately a political rather than a technical or cost consideration. To protect the U.S. homeland and America's North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against a ballistic missile attack is a fundamental vital interest of the United States, and deployment of MD components to
Europe therefore serves to further U.S. strategic interests. This paper argues that the United States must continue to move forward with MD in Europe and work to minimize the domestic and transatlantic political distracters to its implementation.
Strategic Challenges
A missile defense system capability in Europe is critical to the defense of the United States and its NATO allies against a potential ballistic missile attack. The United
States has pursued missile defense to protect the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack for over 20 years. A limited attack is a single ballistic missile or a few ballistic missiles launched against a target in the United States. A limited attack is not meant to address the "leakers" expected if Russia or China were to launch an unexpected massive attack of several hundred or thousand(s) missiles toward the United States.
In pursuit of a MD capability against a limited attack, the United States developed the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Currently that system defends the America from defending itself if the President issues the orders to employ the MD system in Europe.
Background
As Cold War history reminds us, the introduction and development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons during the twentieth century provided adversaries the ability to threaten each other's survival. The totality of the unlimited nature of nuclear warfare with unlimited objectives using unlimited means was real, yet unconscionable to Americans. 3 As the Cold War evolved, periods of proliferation, stalemate, and deterrence ensued. Lawrence Freedman, an acknowledged nuclear strategist provides an understanding of how these concepts interrelate -"the sole long-term role of nuclear weapons was to deter their use by the enemy … [with] the simple view that, in conditions of nuclear stalemate, arsenals of these tremendously powerful weapons tend to cancel each other out." 4 Hence, the 1950's stalemate produced a strategy of massive retaliation that was never very feasible and was consequently short-lived. During this time period the United States intended to deter aggression by depending primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate (with nuclear weapons), instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing. 5 The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the monumental build-up of the capability to deliver massive nuclear strikes by ballistic missiles, resulted in a strategic stalemate necessitating the adoption of a deterrence strategy.
This approach also assumes that no defense is possible and each side is mutually vulnerable. During his presidency, Ronald Reagan decided to address the vulnerability aspect of this assumption. His concern focused on the ability to address an accidental launch of a single (or few) ballistic nuclear-tipped missile(s). His vision was to produce a capability that could intercept an accidental launch and dissolve the situation before an inevitable and automatic massive retaliation by the United States led to nuclear holocaust. Consequently, to offset this vulnerability, the President decided to make missile defense a part of his national security policy. 6 The program envisioned by President Reagan outlived his administration, the Cold War and the Soviet Union, and its legacy is thriving today as the BMDS.
In the last few decades, the United States developed and built its homeland elements of the BMDS while the RF faded from the stature as a superpower once held by its Soviet predecessor. In fact, it was during this period that NATO underwent significant enlargement by adding the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and three of the former Soviet Republics. 7 The United States pursued its MD program unimpeded from external scrutiny or interests until recently when the program progressed to its current phase. This phase entails modernizing existing facilities, constructing additional radars, and emplacing an interceptor site in Europe. and reassure all nations that the system does not threaten the RF.
Despite the unique approach and efforts, the RF's antics did not dissipate and To further complicate the situation for the Russians, the strategic consequences of the incursion into Georgia and the economic crisis confronting the world are gripping the RF. 16 The new RF does not have the economic stability nor the defense resource conversion infrastructure established to challenge the collective capabilities of NATO.
Any attempts to replicate the superpower capabilities once possessed by the Soviet Union may serve to replicate disaster, a disaster similar to economic and infrastructure conditions that contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union.
In essence, the RF tactics are backfiring and perceived as directly threatening to the survival, security and sovereignty of several NATO and European Allies. This approach, if not abandoned by RF leadership serves to further magnetize NATO. This approach is construed as detrimental and continues to drive the Alliance toward unconditional resolve. NATO, and more specifically several of its member nations, consider the Russian behavior threatening. These actions and rhetoric ironically drive NATO to be more relevant in its sphere of influence.
Relevance of Deterrence. Strategic leaders must address the relevance of potentially incorrect or out-dated policy and strategy. The main theme of this paper argues that the Administration must continue the MD program. Additionally, many individuals and countries associate the BMDS program with a deterrence strategy.
However, such a correlation and argument are not appropriate when considering failed state and non-state actors. Thus, it is essential to clarify the application of the strategy of deterrence as it is often incorrectly applied to BMDS.
Deterrence and its application, its associated friction, and its inherent risks must be considered by the Administration. But it must be done within an appropriate context. After the initial defensive capability is established, modification or improvements to address technological advancements or more sophisticated threats can be applied.
Improvements and enhancements developed during the interim period, the period required to construct and employ the BMDS-EC, can be applied thereafter. In this case, the simple answer is that the price is equal to the employment of BMDS-EC.
"The economy will recover (although) it won't recover anytime soon," 22 Despite this simple solution, NATO leadership has aggressively debated the merits of any MD capability. An effective and integrated system could cost NATO tens of billions of dollars or euros. This is an exorbitant cost for the Alliance which is currently struggling to meet the monetary and resource requirements across the entire spectrum of its existing commitments. Several countries dismiss a potential MD capability simply because they feel NATO cannot incur any additional expenses to its strained budget, much less the magnitude of costs associated with establishing an organic or independent MD capability or system. Publicly, the French lead the opposition to MD in States and NATO will not abandon these allies. 29 
NATO Consensus. The prioritization dilemma confronting the Obama
Administration is shared by NATO leadership as they continuously debate the myriad of issues confronting the Alliance, while simultaneously studying and developing a decision/policy on missile defense. Enlargement, terrorism, and the relationship with the European Union are only a few of the strategic issues in NATO competing for attention, prioritization and resources. Growth and shifting focus has made its ability to address and decide upon issues and problems exponentially more difficult in recent years. 30 The dynamics of these strategic issues contribute to the challenges confronting the leadership in an increasingly complex environment.
Considering To address the need for a decision on MD in the Alliance, and to mitigate risk, NATO tasked the Missile Defense Project Group (MDPG) to provide alternatives for a potential MD capability that could eventually emerge into an agreed system or capability. During the past several years, the MDPG and subordinate groups and teams have studied alternatives for consideration available to senior NATO bodies. During the Bucharest Summit in 2008, the Allies declared that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to NATO, confirmed that the Alliance will explore ways to link the U.S. capability with current NATO MD efforts, and tasked the development of options for a comprehensive MD architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the US BMDS-EC for review at the upcoming 2009 Summit. 34 The primary points of friction under study include: costs, desired levels of protection, threat, consequence management, C2 arrangements and the politically sensitive but not practical topic of deterrence.
The MDPG considered the full spectrum of options ranging from the current French position of deterrence (status quo), to variants of systems and components integrated with the BMDS-EC, to broader ideas of an independent and organic NATO system, to the extreme option/course of action of implementing the broader global missile defense system in cooperation with the RF. The MDPG is in the process of providing an agreed proposal to all relevant senior NATO bodies and the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) irrespective of the ongoing debate in the political arena. 35 As debate continues the NAC will determine the agreed proposal to present to the Heads of State and Governments (HoSG). Fueled by the report provided by the MDPG and discussion surrounding the RF influence on member nations, the HoSG will be postured for a decision on the future of MD in NATO at the Summit later this year. If we can prevent one attack -whether it be from another country, from a non-state actor, terrorist organization using these types of weapons -one attack on an American city -we would more than pay for this program many, many times over … and of course the prevention of the loss of life. Korea on the eve of President Obama's inauguration that they have weaponized enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons 40 (coupled with their posturing of a missile for launch as previously described); and the concerns about the future stability of the government of a nuclear Pakistan. 41 Albeit these developments are not part of the agreed NATO threat assessment itself, they certainly exist as potential problems.
U.S. National Interests
The current events in the world pose a threat to the security of the homeland and NATO. Adopting the BMDS-EC employment will ensure for the protection of the homeland and the people, territory, and forces of the U.S. and NATO. In consideration that MD is one of the highest priorities of homeland defense, employment of the system prior to the threat launching an attack is paramount. 2 The United States Ballistic Missile Defense System -European Component BMDS-EC is comprised of several different assets and facilities in Europe. Most of the discussion in NATO concerns the radar site planned for the Czech Republic, the interceptor site planned for Poland, and forward-based radar to be positioned in the southeast region of NATO.
3 Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 742. This realization is extracted from the discussion in the text when the United States was struggling with its foreign policy approach and decisions in the face of the risk of nuclear destruction in the 1950s.
